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We investigate the organisational ﬁeld of general dental practice and how agents change or maintain the
institution of values associated with the everyday work of health care provision. Our dataset comprise
archival literature and policy documents, interview data from ﬁeld level actors, as well as service delivery
level interview data and secondary data gathered (2011e12) from 16 English dental practices. Our
analysis provides a typology of institutional logics (prevailing systems of value) experienced in the ﬁeld
of dental practice. Conﬁrming current literature, we ﬁnd two logics dominate how care is assessed:
business-like health care and medical professionalism. We advance the literature by ﬁnding the
business-like health care logic further distinguished by values of commercialism on the one hand and
those of accountability and procedural diligence on the other. The logic of professionalism we also ﬁnd is
further distinguished into a commitment to clinical expertise and independence in delivering patient
care on the one hand, and concerns for the autonomy and sustainability of a business enterprise on the
other.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Market-based health care reforms, emphasising reductions in
state involvement, creating incentives for greater efﬁciency
through competition, and moving from ‘public service ethic’ to-
wards private management styles, have been sources of concern in
the UK and beyond (Segall, 2000). There is pervasive unease that
demands for greater care efﬁciencies traduce professional stan-
dards; logics of cost can restrict ability to give the best available
care, and logics of commodiﬁcation belie the idea of a patient being
special, unique even (Gabriel, 2009). Relman (2007) for example,
writes ‘the essence of medicine is so different from that of ordinary
business that they are inherently at odds’ (p.2669), predicting
medical professionalism cannot survive a commercialised health
care market. UK general dental practice is, however, somewhat
distinct; whilst being part of the National Health Service (NHS),
provision has been governed using quasi-market principles for
many years and a mixed economy of publicly subsidized and fully
out-of-pocket paid (private) care exists (Taylor-Gooby, Sylvester,vices Research, University of
m B113, 1-5 Brownlow Street,
: þ44 (0)151 794 5604.
).
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Calnan & Manley, 2000). Our study investigates the institutionali-
zation of this joining of professional and commercial ‘logics’, spe-
ciﬁcally recent developments, from the organizational perspective
of providers, the dental practice.
At the outset we approach our study as one concerning the
institutional work of agents in which it is neither individual agents
nor institutional structures, but their mutual expression, that
forms, sustains and upsets the logics by which everyday activity
ﬁnds legitimation. Thus we investigate agents absorbing, adapting
or challenging prevailing and emerging institutional expectations
surrounding innovation, accountability, economic efﬁciencies,
well-being and professionalism. One such logic can dominate
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993), for example the prevailing pre-
eminence of clinicians in health care decision-making (Battilana,
2009), which then gives way, or is accompanied by ‘rival’ logics,
associated with commercialism say (Currie, Lockett, Finn, Martin &
Waring, 2012; Reay & Hinings, 2009).
In the context of UK dental practice we too ﬁnd multiple logics
associated with clinical professionalism and commerce. The pro-
fessionalism associated with clinical expertise we ﬁnd extended to
a concern with preserving the viability of an enterprise (the prac-
tice) upon whose ﬂourishing the livelihood of employees and the
integrity of the wider local community depend. The logic of busi-
ness is also reﬁned, as through making sense of institutional
pressures to be a business, dental practices experience values
associated with both accounting probity and commercial innova-
tion. In some instances we ﬁnd dental practice accommodating all
R. Harris, R. Holt / Social Science & Medicine 94 (2013) 63e7064four forms of logic, readilymoving between them, or invoking them
at one and the same time.
Our paper proceeds as follows. We introduce institutional work
theory and its usewithin the ﬁeld of health care, into which we also
bring other studies of dental practice touching on questions of
institutional reform and evaluation of care. We then describe our
secondary and interview data. Our ﬁndings we organize into a ty-
pology of logics and discuss their implication for understanding
how evaluations of health care provision in dental practice, and
more broadly, are conﬁgured through mutual expressions of
structure and agency.
The institutional setting of UK dental practice
Almost 80% of the 31,000 practising dentists (40% are female) in
the UK work in dental practice (Kravitz & Treasure, 2009). Since the
establishment of the General Dental Service (GDS), practitioners
have acted as independent contractors to the NHS. They own their
own premises, employ their own staff and pay expenses (like ma-
terials) from income. Under NHS contractual terms practices are
free to provide as much or as little NHS care and private care as they
wish. The vast majority of practitioners do at least some NHS work;
on average NHS practitioners spend 75% of their time on NHS work.
Whilst the majority of UK practitioners work alongside other
dentists in professional partnerships (P2), (Greenwood, Hinings &
Brown, 1990), a third of the 11,000 practices are solo practices,
where just one dentist owns the practice and provides care (Kravitz
& Treasure, 2009). Government removal of restriction on the
number of Bodies Corporate (DBCs) in 2006 made market entry
easier for practices owned by external commercial organisations,
giving rise recently to several large chains of DBCs, trading on stock
markets and owning upwards of 300 practices. Supplementary
material.
The GDS is one of the few areas of the NHS where patients are
involved in co-payment, meaning commercial and health-care
concerns are intimate. Legislation enacted in 1951 allowing pa-
tient charges for dentures became the ﬁrst charges of any kind to be
levied for NHS care (King,1998). This was quickly extended to allow
for patient charges for other types of treatments. This precedent of
co-payment has been a feature of NHS GDS care ever since.
Studying the established and emerging criteria by which dental
practice is evaluated involves concern for multiple agents (clini-
cians, managers, suppliers, patients, politicians, commissioning
bodies, professional bodies etc.); institutional settings (public pol-
icy agenda, health and safety procedures, market forces, etc.) and
norms (professionalism, affordability). There is no dominant agent
or institutional force, rather agency is experienced in following
established institutional settings, and institutions are animated,
deepened and resisted in being taken-up within ordinary lives. In
UK dentistry this has evolved into a mix of publicly/privately fun-
ded provision. Following DiMaggio and Powell (1983), we can
identify such institutional settings as an organizational ‘ﬁeld’ gov-
erned by prevailing logics, often tacitly expressed, that are beyond
the gift of individuals to change, and which govern what effective
care means. A ﬁeld acts as a ‘common meaning system, where
participants interact more frequently and fatefully with each other
than with actors outside the ﬁeld’ (Meyer, 2010; Scott, 2001: pp.
138e139). Thornton & Ocasio (1999), p. 804, for example, deﬁne
institutional logics as ‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence,
organise time and space, and provide meaning to their social re-
ality’. Logics are the predominating beliefs that create connections
and a common purpose allowing those within a ﬁeld a sense of
grounding, orthodoxy and habituated normalcy; it is through logicsthat organization, actors and agency are woven into one another
(Friedland & Alford, 1991).
To study health care logics is to investigate howagency, whether
from individuals or organizations, commits, adapts and challenges
prevailing structures of symbolic value and evaluation (the criteria
by which care provision is considered effective) from within the
ﬁeld and beyond, whilst accepting agency persists only by being
institutionalisedwithin such structures (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca,
2009, 2011, pp.1e28; Meyer, 2010). By agency is meant the capacity
to effect somehow the social world; professions, for example, being
institutional agents who shape, legitimate and distribute the
knowledge and practices governing activity like health care pro-
vision (Scott, 2008). This institutional perspective fosters analysis
of the ways in which agents enact their environment and are
similarly acted upon by the same environment, in everyday work
settings (Lawrence et al., 2009, pp. 1e28).
So understanding how health care in UK dental practice is
appreciated we attend to, and look beyond, speciﬁc decisional re-
sponses to immediate problems of co-ordination and control;
accepting that institutional structures like professional ethics,
proﬁt-based market forces and prevailing ideas of ‘health’ have
meaning outside of any speciﬁc individual’s interpretation. Insti-
tutionalized conditions form the non-negotiable grounding allow-
ing agency to occur. These processes of institution cannot be
reduced to the instrumental logic of a decision, to institutionalize is
to infuse the ﬁeld with values that pertain beyond the immediate
technical requirements of tasks at hand (Berger & Luckmann,1967).
For example, a patient’s decision to open their mouth whilst lying
prostrate in a chair is only possible in a setting of habituated ex-
pectations concerning: the competence and integrity of pro-
fessionals; the desirability of healthy teeth; the probity of payment
mechanisms, and so on. Yet none of this institutional settlement is
immutable. No sooner is such a ﬁeld posited than its dynamic na-
ture becomes apparent (Lawrence et al., 2011). Fields are perme-
able, inﬂuenced by logics from other ﬁelds (e.g. employment law
and litigation systems in legal ﬁelds) and from within as actors
espouse multiple logics (e.g. personal dogmas). In being enacted,
disruption can occur as actors take the logics on, tarry with them,
innovate even. Such enactment is often open, with agency effects
being more nuanced than simply resistance to or acceptance of
institutional values (Currie, Lockett, et al., 2012).
Several logics may co-exist within an organisational ﬁeld,
although one is generally dominant. Kitchener and Mertz (2010),
for example, found a dominant logic in US dental practice of clinical
excellence coupled to a top-down, well-structured governance
systems whereby each dental practice was led by the dentist
(typically male) with other actors’ ﬁtting into allotted roles.
Competing with this, though, was an emerging logic associated
with the agency of hygienists, who, seeking alliances within and
beyond the organisational ﬁeld (for examplewith consumer groups
representing the disadvantaged, and with public health pro-
fessionals) wanted to extend provision into disenfranchised areas
and to constitute alternative practices askance from the traditional
professional logic associated with dentist-governed care.
Such struggles are experienced as new practices and norms -
perhaps prompted by breakdown events, new actors, shifts in
leadership, or new technologies - are advocated, and established
ones defended, or amended (Kitchener, 2000; Meyer, 1982). How
actors respond to institutional pressures varies, and in this process
of struggle and resolution, actors are understood to gain skills and
capital for future institutional involvement (Oliver, 1991; Reay &
Hinings, 2005). In the course of such, the meaning and priority of
activities can change given differing logics, with some becoming
redundant or anachronistic, and others lying dormant, to be res-
urrected at a later time, and others surfacing. Reay and Hinings
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competitively as actors seek to champion and assert one set of
values over others as in the case of Kitchener and Mertz’s study, or
more broadly by Relman (2007), subversively (as one logic works
‘under the radar’ of an espoused, dominant logic), or collaboratively
(as adherents ﬁnd structural stability in a form of balanced ‘truce’
despite varied and sometimes conﬂicting understandings). Reay
and Hining’s (2009) study examines a case of collaboration,
though here in the more general organizational ﬁeld health care
provision in Alberta, Canada, ﬁnding uneasy but functional truces
between logics of professionalism (embodied in values of expert
independence, patient care priority and clinically-led provision)
and business (embodied in values of customer satisfaction and cost
effectiveness). ‘Business-like health care’ concerns the legitimacy of
services delivered at lowest cost, based around ‘consumer’ re-
lationships between the patient and health care provider; the
overall goal being to provide efﬁcient and effective services. The
emphasis here is on delivering care with the population set adrift
quasi-market forces in mind, rather than individual patients. They
contrast this with medical professionalism, where the profession is
responsible for controlling the quality of service provision as well as
certifying new approaches when they become available, and the
individual clinician occupies a position of authority vis a vis the
patient and service management. Central to professionalism logic is
the dominance of (protected) clinicianepatient relationships.
The tension between managerialism and professionalism has
been described in studies describing conﬂicting institutional logics
in health care (Currie & Guah, 2007; Kitchener, 2000), with
business-focused institutional logics resisted by professionals
delivering front-line services. Other authors, however, ﬁnd medical
professionalism logics more nuanced. Hanlon (1998) identiﬁes
separate logics associated with professionalism. He distinguishes
‘individualistic professionalism’ (the provider is a ‘gentleman’,
careful of his word and reputation, providing a service to people
who can pay); ‘social service professionalism’ (democratized pro-
fessionalism providing services for everyone); and ‘commercialised
professionalism’ (stressing the value of managerial and entrepre-
neurial skills in providing a cost-effective, quality service), all of
which might persist in evolving mutual inﬂuence rather than the
obliteration of one by others (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood &
Brown, 1996). Commercialism can also be nuanced, with some
arguing care is a commodity whose price is governed by forces of
scarcity and felt want and patients become active choosers rather
than passive recipients (Ozar, 1984). What, then, are the prevailing
commercial and clinical logics being experienced in UK dental
practice?
Method
We conceptualised dental practice as an organisational ﬁeld
consisting of providers (dental practices), resource and product
consumers (patients/customers), regulatory agencies (commis-
sioners, government and professional organisations). Actors within
this ﬁeld (those interacting with each other frequently and fatefully
(Scott, 2001) include: government agencies and departments,
professional bodies such as British Dental Association (BDA), den-
tists and other dental team members; dental accountants and legal
representatives; commissioning bodies and patients. In line with
existing institutional studies of health care practice, at the outset
we conceptualised the prevailing logics as being broadly grounded
in ideas of effective patient care.
National research ethics approval (Reference number 10/H1011/
38) and NHS research governance approvals were obtained for the
study. Our dataset comprised archival documents, as well as
interview data from actors both at the service delivery level (e.g.patients, commissioners, dental practitioners) as well as ﬁeld level
actors (government, professional organisation representatives at
the local and national level, dental corporate providers at Chief
Executive level). The archival dataset comprised ofﬁcial documents
and news releases published by the government and professional
bodies between 1980 and 2012. These were retrieved by hand and
online searches of government and professional publications. Their
content allowed us to prompt discussion in interviews with ﬁeld
level actors (n ¼ 19). These interviews were semi-structured,
grounded in concern for understanding the interviewees’ sense
and experience of delivering ‘effective care’, from which we were
able to identify how dental practices enacted prevailing logics
associated with clinical excellence and sound business practice.
Over 2011e12 we collected service level data from 16 dental
practices in northern England covered by 6 Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs, currently the organizational form responsible for managing
contractual relationships associated with NHS provision). Data
included transcripts of audio-taped interviews with dental practi-
tioners (n ¼ 17), dental team members (n ¼ 11), patients (n ¼ 39),
commissioners (n ¼ 15). Six dentists interviewed provided mainly
private care and 11 dentists provided both NHS and private care to
varying degrees. Dental practitioners and commissioners were
interviewed periodically to follow key events over the study period,
such as contract reviews. Non-participant observation data were
also gathered of meetings between practitioners and commis-
sioners and dental practitioner network meetings. Documentary
evidence relevant to case study events was also gathered, such as e-
mail correspondence, minutes of meetings etc; photographs of
practices (internal and external, for example including signage).
Where interviewees spoke of the dental practices being in conﬂict
with commissioners during the study period, these were studied
with the greatest intensity. In total 8 practitioners and 4 commis-
sioners were interviewedmore than once. In all 57 interviews were
conducted at service delivery level. Using NVIVO 9.2, transcripts
were initially open coded, then re-coded according to theoretical
concepts and emergent categories. Transcripts were analysed to
code data expressing values, norms, beliefs, interactions and
behaviour of actors broadly in relation to concerns with care,
accountability and commerciality. Analysis followed a ‘constant
comparison’ method, where provisional themes emerging from
one set of datawere subsequently compared with other transcripts.
The process of analysis was iterative, with emerging themes dis-
cussed with a wider analysis team alongside further reading of the
literature, leading to reﬁnement of codes and categories
(Numagami, 1998). We have coded data extracts in the results as
follows: the ﬁrst letter denotes separate PCTs; second letter is D if
the participant is a dentist, C if a Commissioner and P if a patient.
The third digit denotes number of participant. PCR represents an
interview held as debrief following contract review meeting be-
tween practitioners and commissioners.
Service-level data: logics in the dental practice ﬁeld
Analysis of the archive data ﬁnds the ﬁeld governed by three,
not two, related logics: Medical professionalism (care through
technical expertise and ethical standards); Business-like health
care (efﬁciency, effectiveness and transparency); and Commercial
logic (using terms like customers not patient, or describing care as a
commodity). Table 1
To gain richer appreciation of how these were currently expe-
rienced, and further reﬁne them, we used analysis of service de-
livery level data. Going from these data back to the logics
conceptualized using analysis of archive data, and back again to
interviews (Orton, 1997), we then found four distinct yet inter-
relating logics we conceptualized as: ownership responsibilities,
Table 1
Indicative statements relating to institutional logics from archival data.
Medical professionalism logic Business-like health care logic Commercialism logic
Providing dental care as a dental professional Delivering dental care according to principles
set by public funders
Supplying dental care as a commodity
Dentists: Do we wish to be considered as entrepreneurs
in the market place e and treated accordingly?
Or as a learned society serving society and
accordingly looked after and rewarded by
society? (Welsh Valley practitioner, 1985)
Dentists: If one relies on patients who have ‘shopped
around’, despite standard NHS fees, then one must
expect patients who are more interested in ‘cheap’
treatment. In the words of a gentleman who called
here recently ‘I would not want to go to a dentist
who had to advertise’ (Crocker, 1986)
Dentists: It is an indisputable fact that professional
standards are absolute and therefore not negotiable.
Standards are limited only by the corpus of
knowledge and achievement of the age
(Bosley, 1987)
Dentists: We applaud both equality and excellence,
but we are not at all sure if we can have them both
(Sear, 1984)
Govt: The available money buys for patients, both
a decent level of quantity and decent quality of care
and treatment, while providing dentists with
a reasonable return for their efforts
(Bloomﬁeld, 1992)
Govt: Money spent on dentistry should be used
effectively and efﬁciently to improve oral health.
Need rather than demand should be the focus of
the system. (Department of Health, 1994)
Govt: PCTs should commission such services as
are necessary to secure access to a high quality
NHS dental service and to improve oral health and
address inequalities (Department of Health, 2002).
Dentists:. We are going to have to market our
services and persuade our patients to part with their
discretionary dollars. Many say that this debases the
profession e hoosh! (Eilertsen, 1986)
Dentists: An increasing quantity of dentistry done
in the UK has little to do with general health..Why
cannot dentistry be considered just one more
consumer good? (Leader, The Probe, 1996)
Dentists: No one enjoys going to the dentist and
patients do not buy dentistry [oral health] as a
commodity. They buy an attractive smile and the
beneﬁts of oral health in that order. ‘Need’ hangs
around the profession’s neck like an albatross
(Gordon, 1997)
Dentists: To give up your freewill and control of
your business to bureaucrats and politicians would
be a gross dereliction of duty to yourselves, your
staff and most of your patients. (Rowe, 2006)
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neurial commercialism. Table 2Ownership responsibilities
Dental practices are often considered independent enterprises
whose viability is the responsibility of the partners. There is a
palpable sense of the practice providing a livelihood for employees,
and of its providing an important community service. It is separate
fromvalues, beliefs and rules related to clinical autonomy insofar as
the expertise is managerial, close to leadership, and the sense of
duty is better described as arising from ownership of a practice for
which they alone are, autonomously, responsible. Values concern-
ing ownership deﬁne ‘the way of doing things’, or the ‘ethos’ of the
practice, ranging from fostering a sense of collectivity amongst staff
in often stressful environments to tending the physical assets of theTable 2
Multiple logics in the dental practice ﬁeld developed from service level data.
Ownership responsibility Professionalism
Composite principles
Authority and managerial responsibility
for practice staff, reputation and
servicing patients and community
Clinical excellence, altruism, best interest of
patients, patient advocacy, technical knowled
professional responsibility and self-governanc
Expression
Try to sustain the business long term
for the sake of staff and patients
Patients are treated according to technical a
ethical values
Close relationships with staff.
Sub-contracting is risky
Give the patients authoritative options
Ownership is beyond owning the
enterprise - it concerns setting
practice ethos
Gatekeeper e police what is available on th
NHS
Concentrate on reputation of the
practice amongst the local
community
Treat NHS and private patients the same
Close relationships with patients ‘coal
face’ built on family/friends
Emphasis on ‘our’/’my’ patients
Assert patients’ best interests, charge struct
second
Keep abreast technically
Individual clinician’s are responsible for dec
what is best for the patient
Do not criticise other clinicianspractice, as well as buildingwider community links. Such autonomy
is also felt negatively, for example through suspicion of employing
‘strangers’ or sub-contracting work. This is risky because the dental
practice is a close-knit, supportive community. Problems with
dental team members place demands on the managerial skills of
dentists. There is therefore recourse to long-standing employees
and familymembers. In theseways, the enterprise carries a sense of
distinction extending beyond its capacity to generate rents.
We are an independent contractor but I’mnot removed from the
practice, I’m not a corporate body where I’m sitting in an ofﬁce,
who has several dental practices but [I’m] working “on the coal
face” as they say. (BD3, fully NHS)
In dentistry personal relationships are extremely strong. (CC2)
I’m a little frightened of employing the younger generation, you
know as two of them were terrible. And I’m not very good atPopulation health managerialism Entrepreneurial commercialism
ge,
e
Trace and explain public
expenditure; govern good
practice.
Trading and opportunity with a
focus on sustaining and developing
a proﬁtable business
nd Patients are treated as a unit Patients as a source of income
Feel part of the NHS
Be accountable via hierarchical
bureaucracy for what you’ve
done and why
Conscious of the market and
consumers’ wishes.
e Meet targets Excite wider demand
Resources governed by need
not demand
See remuneration not based
on balancing income and
expenditure for individual
patients
Commercial GDPs view income as
‘swings and roundabouts’
ures Strategic priority (public policy)
orientated
Range includes piece rate GDPs
Population prevention strategies
Sub contract to others Conscious of branding
iding Dispassionate, issue-based
decision making
Business entrepreneurship
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(DD2, fully NHS)
I think one thing here is we are a small community. You’ve got to
remember that. That the people we see in the waiting room e a
percentage of them are friends. You see them in the shops. (CD3,
90% NHS)
We try to care for them and there are a lot of incentives to do
that because they are not only patients but they are part of the
community. Of course anyone would want to look after them in
that position. (CD3, 90% NHS)
Same practice manager, the same partners but the partners
were always silent because they felt they had to support [the
former principal]. But they have a completely different rela-
tionship now with the PCT. (DC1)
He just wants to be left alone and he thinks if he reaches his UDA
target everything’s ﬁne, never mind all the other issues that go
with it. He just wants to be left alone. He’s the dentist, his wife is
the receptionist/ dental nurse - end of story. (DC1)
We were at a meeting once and the guy, the [PCT] ﬁnancial di-
rector said “We want our practices to do it this way” and I said
“What do you mean, your practices? It’s our practice e you
haven’t put a penny into this practice. We sub contract and do
treatments and you pay us. We bought the building, we put all
the equipment in, we pay all the staff, how come it’s your
practice?” (DD1, 100% private)
I don’t like the idea of being told what I can or can’t do by a third
party. “Use this software” or “You don’t do this”. Even if it’s
nothing to do with your clinical practicee I don’t like the idea of
that. (ED1, 20% NHS)
Professionalism
This long standing and well-attested logic espouses dentists, as
experts, always acting in the patients’ best interest, and according to
professionally deﬁned standards of care as judged by the individual
clinician at the dental chair-side. The belief that each clinician is
individually responsible for the care that they provide according to
this threshold means daily clinical practice of other practitioners is
rarely challenged. The reluctance reveals the skills gained through
apprenticeship into professionalism are neither gained nor lost
lightly.
I try and keep the ethos which is straight forward and simple.
I’m not really bothered too much clinically if the patient can pay
for treatment or not. I’m interested in whether or not I can look
after their mouth. (AD1, fully NHS)
The professionalismwe adopt is of the highest standard because
we’re using our skills to teach a junior colleague to make sure
that they have not only the quality of professionalism but the
capability to be self determining at the end of the one year
training. (AD1, training practice).
To me it’s all. I look at it and to be honest sometimes I think I
don’t really know what that percentage means and I don’t un-
derstand it. But to me I am not bothered about things like that. I
mean, I look at it and our patients are 100% satisﬁed with what
treatment they are getting. (AD2, 20% NHS)
I personally don’t like to sell too much. I like to treat the patients
e do the care that’s needed to them and know that we are doing
it on the NHS and avoid too much of the selling aspects because
then it becomes like. you know.. you have to sell as well what
you are providing. (BD3)My values stay the same (for private or NHS patients). It’s a
professional part of being ethical. My values don’t really change.
If I started making decisions based purely on economics (for
example) then I’d start to question my ethics. (CD1, 20% NHS)
I’d be at a loss to justify it, there was no justiﬁcation. I’ve got my
patients best interest as my best interest. (CD1, 20% NHS)
I am not in a position to comment on that because we look after
our own patients here, I don’t inspect other practices. (CD3, 90%
NHS).
My customer is the person who wants my services, that is my
patient - NHS or private, I don’t differentiate the way I treat
people. (ED1, 20% NHS)Population health managerialism
Value-for-money assessments pervade all modes of NHS care
provision, especially peripheral and commercially inured dental
practice. For many interviewees value-for-money was synonymous
with low cost tendering rather than doing more with less. There
was appreciation that against a backdrop of scarce resources
achieving equity of provision was important, involving reporting
and record-keeping to ensure actions are transparent. This logic,
then, is one of being held accountable, but to which constituency?
Interviewees’ comments gather around achieving NHS targets and
being open and transparent to commissioners and other policy
makers, and patients. These targets and procedures, however, were
considered often inconsistent, requiring tactical abeyance. A basic
expression of this comes amongst those acknowledging income
generation through NHS provision being an experience of ‘swings
and roundabouts’, with less proﬁtable interventions being offset by
more highly remunerated ones.
We had a practice who were delivering not even gold standard,
but probably platinum standard which was very, very nice but
completely unaffordable. (CC1)
We handle it by keeping a close eye on our UDAs and we know
whenwe’re coming up to the number and thenwe’ll stop seeing
children. (AD2, 20% NHS)
In order to improve the quality of care we had to shed some
numbers. (CD1, 20% NHS)
There is a daily count andmonthly count. And we’ll just know as
we go along, and it just seems to work. (CD3, 90% NHS).
It is a business at the end of the day, you do have to ensure
you’re getting the best costs when it comes to materials but as
foremost I still myself as a public [servant]. (BD3, fully NHS)
Well I’m more or less relieved when I’ve more or less achieved
my stupid targets because that really would be the last straw
really, if I didn’t e which is sad. Well, it’s pointless. I mean, I
don’t know what the point of worrying is (laughs). It’s not
achieving anything other than trying to stay ﬁnancially viable.
(DD2, fully NHS)
The guy whose private crowns I did yesterday, he could afford
the private crowns but he doesn’t need the crowns. He’s got a bit
of gum recession and you can see the margins on his front teeth,
his wife is giving him earache and I can’t turn around to the
Treasury and say “This guy’s wife is whinging that he needs 2
crowns, stuff the bill”. On the other hand you could be in a sit-
uation where if the PCT is penalising you for underperforming
by 4% ormore inmy UDAs, maybe I could turn a blind eye and do
those crowns because I need the 12 UDAs. It’s that sort of
R. Harris, R. Holt / Social Science & Medicine 94 (2013) 63e7068dilemma, moral dilemma, and that’s where you’ve got to try and
be quite professional about it. (BD1, fully NHS)
Well if you’re a GDP and in the NHS you know you’ve got targets
to reach, you’ve got to see so many patients and all that to get
your money and it’s no wonder that some people (like this
practice), sort of decided, well we’ll just go private because
we’re not getting paid enough for what we’re doing. (AD2 P4)Entrepreneurial commercialism
There is growing awareness of dental care offering commercial
opportunity. The practice was often spoken of commercially, a
commercial space of service delivery, income and proﬁtability.
Some spoke of opportunities to expand (grow practice through
acquisition or joint ventures), entering new areas of business
(cosmetic services), and investing in marketing (advertising,
sponsorship).
I am a businessman and I initially thought of this contract on day
one as a business. Trust me I’d be a lot more rapid in terms of
marketing but I didn’t want to peak the practice because it’s
essential to be positioned. (AD3, fully NHS)
We have the best opportunity to work one on one with anybody
because they’re a captive audience. Sometimes it’s difﬁcult for
them to speak. That’s OK, that’s great, you can tell them
whatever you like, they can’t argue. But you can get a point
across. You’ve got someone sitting in a chair one on one for half
an hour. You should be able to sell them anything. (BD1, 95%
NHS)
We have xxx who was just sitting in the corner there, she is our
on-site business manager and she looks at turnover, our
expenditure, keeping material costs sensible, ﬁnding the best
deals on bills, services. (BD2, 100% private)
The public sector, maybe they don’t deal with the money side of
it as much. I’m not really sure, because I sit and look at proﬁt-
ability of every single site on amonthly basis.whether a public
sector servant does that.? (CD2 corporate)
And we didn’t want to be branded NHS either. I can remember
being at a meeting and I said “Whywould you want to be part of
a brand that doesn’t have a very good reputation?” Boots e yeah
(laughter) e not the NHS. It has got a brand problem, the NHS.
(DD1, 100% private)
It’s not limited in any way. The limit on what we do is what the
patient is prepared to pay for as opposed to practical limitations.
(DD1, 100% private)
A lot of dentists don’t see the wood for the trees, they don’t
realise how they can provide better dentistry and hey, make a
living for themselves. (ED1, 20% NHS)Discussion
By identifying the experience of four interrelating logics, two
aspects are worth elaborating arise: their interaction and their
contingency. Dental practitioners enact and cope with differing
logics, not merely in an ‘uneasy truce’ of one bloc set against
another (Reay and Hinings, 2009), but are interweaving threads
running throughout their everyday activity. This interactionwe ﬁnd
quite explicitly in the practice of some dentists (BD3 for example)
fully aware of the practice as a business, yet also avowing a status of
public servant and resistant to the idea of his selling a service. Forall actors, and especially dentists, the organizational ﬁeld appears
marbled with commercial logic; even those eschewing its values
acknowledge its deﬁning a collective proper space within which
they must act. Indeed, for many, commercialism appears less in
conﬂict with professionalism than does population health mana-
gerialism, notably the bureaucratic and inefﬁcient structures de-
tailing forms of apportioning of care, oftenwith little regard for the
ordinary experiences of patient need. So (notably BD1 e in the set
of quotes relating to population health managerialism) the tension
of ‘facing the patient’ and deciding eligibility for NHS treatment
brings the experience of pressure from targets given by commis-
sioners into tension with professional values putting care above
affordability, as well as commercial and business autonomy values
arising from the satisfaction of patients and maintaining patient
ﬁdelity. Here all four logics are being woven. Arguments concerning
whether commercial logics (Relman, 2007), or business-like health
care (Segall, 2000) are incompatible with professionalism are seen
as too simplistic in the light of this more subtle representation.
Our data suggests that the cost-conscious logic of delivering
value-for-money care espoused through population health mana-
gerialism would be better ensured with closer ties to strict
commercialism, rather than pursuing with public sector auditing
and commissioning. This is in keeping with the argument put for-
ward by Hanlon (1998), that while public and private sectors derive
their economic and ideological basis from different sources
(namely the state and the market), the two sectors share much in
common, the experience is not readily reduced to conceptual op-
position. Entrepreneurial commercialism resonates with, as much
as it resists, the logics on professionalism and ownership re-
sponsibility. Though many actors sustain grounding commitments
to professionalism and, by implication, place overtly commercial
ideas of care second, they all acknowledge the responsibility for
sustaining viable enterprises. The commercial can erode a
commitment to provide the best possible care, forcing ability to pay
onto the relationship, yet some dentists acknowledge counter-
balancing forces, for example an increased sensitivity to patient
demand. Their expertise is negotiated in conversation with pa-
tients, and the criteria by which care is understood expands. As a
result of the pull of commercial logic, dentists understand what is
‘wanted’ by patients in terms of speciﬁc services (tooth whitening,
straightening, ﬁlling colour). Commercialism also feeds into a sense
of autonomy, with dentists increasingly aware of patients as the
source of income from which their livelihood springs. This rela-
tional awareness extends beyond the meeting point at the dental
chair, with practices well aware of being sustained by reputation in
the community, creating a persisting sense of ﬁdelity between
practitioners and their patients outside of the immediacy of surgery
exchange. These ﬁndings expand on Doolin’s (2002) study of hos-
pital clinicians in New Zealand that draws similar conclusions.
Whilst the norms and values of enterprise and entrepreneurialism
marble discourses of public-sector reform, it is within the private
practice of clinicians where professionalism and enterprise are
often less in conﬂict.
Another apparent weaving of logics, though here more antag-
onistic, was a tension between ownership responsibility and pop-
ulation health managerialism. This is not a new theme in the
literature relating tomedical practice (Harrison and Dowsell, 2002).
Whilst government involvement in health care delivery has been
diminishing in the UK in an era where health policy is geared to-
wards an increased use of competition and markets following an
claimed effect of reducing costs and maintaining quality; in the
USA, reforms have moved towards greater government control,
with the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(2010). Models of UK and USA dental practice delivery have
mirrored this change, moving the systems closer together (Currie,
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pressures in the 1990s which diminished public funding for dental
care, dentists have increasingly grown the private element of their
practice and reduced their NHS commitment. The UK, a system
once dominated by public sector provision under central govern-
ment control is thus becoming more akin to dental practice in the
USA. There dental care is delivered via a decentralised system
dominated by private enterprise, although there too, there are
institutional pressures (sometimes resisted by dental practices) to
introduce a public health approach, where prevention of disease is
prioritised, a diverse workforce is used, including hygienists, and
coverage of the population is increased (Currie, Pretty, et al., 2012).
Our study helps understand where tensions lie when population
health managerialism, which represents an increase in account-
ability, encounters strong resistance from professionals concerned
about autonomy and ownership responsibility.
The constant interaction between logics also suggests their be-
ing contingent, viz that certain logics predominate depending on
prevailing circumstances. Cooper et al. (1996) describe how, whilst
logics provide coherence and meaning in the form of value norms
and procedural standards, they are only ever sedimented through
structures as processes. New organisational forms arise, differing
technologies and hence actors arrive, economies expand or
implode, all of which ﬁnds actors having to work at weaving the
logics by which they work continually. The idea of care is proces-
sual, infused with settlements and tensions playing out through
history and across different spaces. Structurally, some UK dental
practitioners, for example, clearly accepted new roles and identity
as businesses whilst others were more reticent. Advancing on Scott
(2008), this acceptance is not readily reduced to an either-or op-
position. For example, some interviewees spoke of the emergence
of new structures such as Dental Bodies Corporates that organise
care to allow some less commercially orientated practitioners to
continue practicing, outsourcing business pressures by relinquish-
ing their partnerships and enterprise to professional management,
and allowing them to concentrate on medical expertise. Equally,
moves to independent private practice provided a route for more
commercially minded practitioners to avoid the pressures of pop-
ulation health managerialism, whilst still maintaining allegiance to
the logic of ownership responsibility whereby care is appreciated as
community duty and extends beyond the medical to include con-
tributions to the local economy. This sense of connection extends
and expands the experience of providing care on a day-to-day basis,
here the logic changes the practice, and changes with it. So whilst a
logic of professionalism ﬁnds clinical expertise paramount and
unimpeachable, many dentists were discussing care as something
that was emerging from experiences of engagement rather than
retaining clinical distance; expert views were no longer being
imposed from patrician distance. Following Boiko, Robinson, Ward
and Gibson (2011), and nuancing the conclusion of Battilina (2006)
concerning the continued dominance of clinical perspectives on the
idea of care, we found dental practice being conﬁgured by reﬂex-
ivity in care. Among many practices the feelings of patients - their
experience of problems and solutions - carry weight; it is not
simply the dental ‘look’ that counts. So talking through options
with patients, discussing side effects, showing care as an array of
possibility (with differing price implications), and in general being
aware of care from the patient’s perspective, were very apparent.
The idea of there being a separable source of controlling agency
within the organizational ﬁeld became a very distant one.
In summary, in addition to adding a more nuanced typology of
logics to the ﬁeld of dental care, our study also advances on others
by suggesting two modes by which these logics are experienced:
constant interaction and contingency. In this way our study con-
tributes signiﬁcantly to overcoming the hegemony/resistancecategorisation of logics that has hitherto characterized the ﬁeld of
studies investigating the impacts of managerialist logics upon
professionalism in health care (Numerato, Salvatore & Fattore,
2011). By following an institutional work perspective, and investi-
gating multiple agents (both within and across different forms of
organization) we work beyond those macro theories ascribing
unitary forms to the prevailing logics by which different actors
appreciate and assess the idea of care. Following Numerato et al.
(2011), we have found it is not so simple as placing the actions
and experience of clinicians and managers on continuum from
resistance at one end to compliance at the other.
Conclusion
Our study develops the work of Reay and Hinings (2005, 2009)
and follows their call for studies in different organisational ﬁelds
where multiple logics exist, particularly where actors hold strong
identities and sources of power that facilitate their ongoing inde-
pendence In this we follow Battilana’s (2006) call to expand the
level of analysis to broach organizational and individual levels,
touching even those of community pressure. We also add to
Kitchener and Mertz (2010) in creating an institutional study of
dental practice, though here in England, and with an emphasis on
the institutional logics governing the provision of health care. We
assume that well attested logics associated with clinical profes-
sionalism on the one hand, and business on the other, are sufﬁcient
to convey the experience of dental patient services. We ﬁnd actors
being guided by and modulating multiple logics, with differing
degrees of enthusiasm, integration and awareness. These logics are:
ownership responsibility; professionalism; population health
managerialism; entrepreneurial commercialism.
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